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NOTE
CHILDREN AS WITNESSES - COMPETENCY - AMENABILITY
TO PUNISHMENT FOR PERJURY
A recent case, Santillian v. State, 182 South Western, 2d (Tex.) 812, presents
an unusual problem. The defendant was convicted on the charge of -selling
marijuana. The indictment alleged that the defendant sold the drug to a 15-
year old boy, and his testimony was necessary to sustain the conviction. On ap-
peal, the defendant contended that the boy was an incompetent witness. Section
5 of Article I of the Texas, Constitution provides: "No person shall be disqualified
to give evidence in any of the Courts of this State on account of his religious
opinions, or for the want of any religious belief, but all oaths or affirmations shall
be administered in the mode most binding upon thL conscience, and shall be taken
subject to the pains and penalties of perjury." A Texas statute, known as the
Delinquent Child Act, establishes a juvtnile court in every county and provides
a procedure for the trial of delinquent children in such courts. Under the Act
.a child" is a boy over the age of ten and under tl age of seventeen years or a
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girl over the age of ten and under the age of eighteen years. A "delinquent child"
under the Act includes, inter alia, one "who violates any penal law of this state
of the grade of felony." In Texas, perjury is a felony.
The defendant, in the case under discussion, argued that the provisions
of the Delinquent Child Act are not for punishment but for custodial protection
of the child for its own good and for the good of society generally, and that the
procedure provided by the Act takes out of the Code of Criminal Procedure any
handling of juveniles and, therefore, a juvenile committing perjury is not amen-
able to, or subject to, any criminal prosecution; and, hence, is not a qualified
witness under Section 5, Article I of the Texas Constitution. The court conceded
that one who is not amenable to punishment for perjury is not a competent
witness. However, the court said that if a child within the age fixed by the
Delinquent Child Act should commit perjury, the child would be proceeded
against in the juvenile court, rather than the ordinary criminal courts, and might
be sent to a reformatory instead of the penitentiary; that the Juvenile Court Act
changed the manner of enforcing the law against children, but did not change
the crime nor the necessary facts. It changes the manner of trying it and the
manner of charging it, but the offence would be the same so far as the act of the
child in testifying falsely is concetned; it would not relieve the child of punish-
ment, but changes the place of punishment and the mode of trial. The court,
therefore, concluded that the Delinquent Child Act does provide for "punish-
ment" within the statutory provision relating to the qualification of witnesses,
and that a child, sworn as a witness, does so "subject to the pains and penalties
of perjury."
It is interesting to note how a similar contention against the competency of a
child witness could be answered in Pennsylvania. The Preamble of the Penn-
sylvania Statute, Act of June 2, 1933, P. L. 1433, creating a Juvenile Court, sets
forth that children should be guarded from association and contact with crime
and criminals and that guidance and control over delinquent children should be
clearly distinguished from those txercised in the ordinary administration of the
criminal law. Section 19 of the Act provides, "No order made by any juvenile
court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by
the criminal laws of the Commonwealth, nor shall any child be deemed to be a
criminal by reason of any such order or to be deemed to have been convicted of
crime." Under the Act a "child" is a minor under the age of eighteen years and a
"delinquent child" includes, inter alia, a child who has violated any law of the
Commonwealth. Under Section 322 of the Penal Code of June 24, 1939, P. L.
872, perjury is a felony. If there were in Pennsylvania any constitutional or
statutory provision similar to the Texas constitutional provision, making amena-
bility to punishment for perjury a test of the competency of a witness, it might
well be argued that a child of juvenile court age, in view of the purposes of the
Juvenile Court Act and the provisions of Section 19 thereof, is not amenable to
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punishment for perjury and is not a competent witness. However, as in the Texas
case, any such contention could adequately be met by holding that a child under
the age of eighteen who commits perjury and is proceeded against in juvenile
court, may, under the Act, be placed on probation, committed to a suitable insti-
tution for the care; guidance and control of delinquents, committed to an indus-
trail or training school, or, if over the age of sixteen years, committed to a state
industrial school. Thus it could be held that a child would be amenable to
"punishment" and, therefore, would be a competent witness.
What has just been said, however, is entirely supposition, for there is in
Pennsylvania no constitutional or statutory provision similar to the Texas con-
stitutional provision which makes amenability to punishment for perjury a test
of competency of witnesses. In Pennsylvania the substantial test of competency
of an infant witness is his intelligence and his comprehension of an obligation to
tell the truth: Commonwealth v. Goldman, 127 Pa. Super. 523. In Common-
wealth v. Furman, 211 Pa. 549, the court held that an infant witness is competent
if he comprehends the difference between truth and falsehood and realizes his
duty to tell the truth, and that in passing on the question of competency, the trial
judge has a wide discretion. In that case a child of eight years was held to be
competent. In Piepke v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad, 242 Pa. 321, the court
said that the competency of a witness is not a question of years but of the capacity
of the proposed witness to recollect the matter on which he is to testify, to under-
stand the questions put to him, to give rational answers to these questions, and
to know that he ought to tell the truth; that competency depends upon the sense
and reason the child entertains and the danger of the impiety of falsehood. In
this case the court held that it was error to exclude a child as a witness merely
because he was seven years of age, without attempting to determine the ap-
plicability of the rule just stated. In Commonwealth v. Troy, 274 Pa. 265, a boy
nine years of age, was held to be a competent witness because hie met the usual
test applied by courts to children to determine whether they understood the re-
sult of false swearing, by answering that he knew that if he did not tell the truth
he would go to hell. Lower court cases to the same effect are Bardell v. Searfoss,
17 Luz. L. Reg. 343; Sblerkus v. Radbill, 19 Del. 620; Commonwealth v. Quinn,
20 Dist. 85.
The provisions of Section 19 of the Juvenile Court Act present other inter-
esting points. Under the Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, a person who has been
convicted in a court of this Commonwealth of perjury or subornation of perjury
is thereafter incompetent as a witness; but to be incompetent under this Act it is
necessary that the person shall have been convicted of perjury. Accordingly, it
has been held that a witness is not incompetent at the trial of a criminal case
because he admits on the stand that he committed perjury before the committing
magistrate, for the reason that he has not been convicted, that is, there has been
no judgment by the imposition of sentence: Commonwealth v. Lewandowski,
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74 Pa. Super. 512. In Commonwealth v. Miller, 6 Pa. Super. 35, one who had
been found guilty of perjury, but not yet sentenced, was held to be a competent
witness because there had been as yet no conviction. In Commonwelath vs.
Pearlman, 126 Pa. Super. 461, a person who had pleaded guilty to perjury but
had not yet been sentenced, was likewise held to be a competent witness. Suppose
that a child under eighteen should commit perjury and was thereafter brought
into juvenile court and perhaps, for his offence, sent to an industrial school; it
is submitted that he would not thereafter be incompetent as a witness, because
Section 19 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that a child shall not, by reason
of any order made by the juvenile court, be deemed to be a criminal or be
deemed to have been convicted of crime.
Nor, it is submitted, could the credibility of a child, committed to an insti-
tution by a juvenile court for perjury or any other crime, be attacked on the ground
that he had been convicted of crime under the well known rule that the credibility
of a witness may be attacked by showing that he has been convicted of a felony
or a misdemeanor crimen falsi: Commonwealth v. Spanos, 153 Pa. Super. 547.
Under the rule last stated, the credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing
that he has been convicted of the type of crime mentioned, but it cannot be shown
that he has committed a crime for which he was never convicted: Commonwealth
v. Varano, 258 Pa. 442; Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264. Although
a cihld may have committed perjury and been committed therefor to an institu-
tion, under Section 19 of the Juvenile Court Act he has not been convicted and
the crime could not be shown to attack his credibility as a witness.
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